Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion

1. Introduction: Concepts in Thought, Action and Emotion

Christoph Demmerling and Dirk Schroeder

Part I. Concepts and Experience

2. Concepts and Experience: A Non-Representationalist Perspective

Hans-Johann Glock

3. Conceptualism and the Notion of a Concept

Hannah Ginsborg

4. Concepts, Belief, and Perception

Alex Byrne

5. The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology

Eva Schmidt

Part II. Concepts and Language

6. Conceptual Thought Without Language? The Case from Animal Cognition

Markus Wild

7. Concepts, Normativity, and Self-Knowledge: On Ginsborg's Notion of Primitive Normativity

David Lauer

8. A Role for Language in Concept Formation

Jasper Liptow

9. Practical Understanding, Concepts, and Language

Dirk Schroeder

Part III. Concepts and Knowledge-How

10. Concepts and Action: Know-how and Beyond

David Loewenstein

11. Knowledge-How and Its Exercises

Hannes Worthmann

12. Practical Understanding: Skill as Grasp of Method

John Bengson

13. Primary Know-How: Understanding Through Practical Concepts

Martin Weichold

Part IV. Concepts and Emotion

14. Emotions Inside Out: The Nonconceptual Content of Emotions

Christine Tappolet

15. A Challenge to Perceptual Theories of Emotion

Jan Slaby

16. Emotions and the Conceptual Space of Human Life

Christoph Demmerling

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• Epistemologia e teoria do conhecimento: Filosofia
• Filosofia da linguagem
• Filosofia da mente
• Psicologia: emoções

Dirk Schroeder;Christoph Demmerling;Hans-Johann Glock;Hannah Ginsborg;Alex Byrne;Eva Schmidt;Taylor Carman;Hannes Worthmann;John Bengson;Martin Weichold;Christine Tappolet;Jan Slaby;David Laurer;Markus Wild;Jasper Liptow;concepts;action;epistemology;philosophy of language;philosophy of emotions;knowledge how;practical understanding;propositional content;representational content;experience;sensibility;concept-possession;self-knowledge;primitive normativity;belief;reasons first epistemology;anti-intellectualism;salience;animal cognition;conceptual change;Non-conceptual Content;Nonconceptual Content;Language philosophy;Conceptual thought;Vice Versa;Emotions philosophy;Conceptual Capacities;Violate;Affective Intentionality;Propositional Knowledge;Phenomenal Concepts;Basic Perceptual Belief;Brain Body System;Concept Acquisition;Recalcitrant Emotions;Conceptualist Thesis;Practical Concepts;Non-human Animals;Episodic Emotions;Conceptual Phenomena;Animal Thoughts;Conceptual Abilities;Scrub Jay;Dispositionalist Account;Piping Plover